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THE DECEPTIVE 'RIGHT TO KNOW':
HOW PESSIMISM REWROTE THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
Gerald J. Baldasty* and Roger A. Simpson**
In the decade of the 1940's, particularly in the years just after World
War II, freedom of the press, which had been newly elevated and protected by the Supreme Court in the 1930's, began to suffer the corrosive
effects of doubt about the strength of the American political system.
Among the devastations of war was the failure of the intellectuals' confidence in the mettle of the American citizenry. By the mid-1960's, one
consequence was clear: The first amendment no longer meant that the
American press was expected to speak freely; it had begun to mean that
much of what the press said had to be responsive to assumptions about
those who might receive the communication. The idea of a public "right
to know" had begun to undermine the solid foundations of press freedom.
Since 1964, the Court has elevated the idea of a right to know to such
an extent that the traditional imperative of a right to speak, developed so
extensively by the Supreme Court in the 1930's, can no longer be confidently assumed. Hollow rights have been advanced on behalf of consumers to justify governmental controls on press content. This article shows
the origins of this wrongheaded theory of the first amendment in the intellectual ferment of the years immediately after World War II. It examines
the evolution of Court thinking in three areas of press law: libel, broadcast regulation, and commercial speech.'
I.

FREE EXPRESSION: 1919-39

Under Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, the Court began in 1931 to
build a durable framework for freedom of the press. 2 Government
*Assistant Professor, School of Communications, University of Washington. B.A., University of
Washington; M.A., University of Wisconsin-Madison; Ph.D., University of Washington.
**Associate Professor, School of Communications, University of Washington. B.A., University
of Washington; M.S., University of Wisconsin-Madison; Ph.D., University of Washington,
1. Evidence of the decline of press rights can be found in other areas of press law, as well. These
three areas, however, show particulary well how Court views of the first amendment have changed.
See Part IV infra.
2. Harold L. Nelson described the Hughes Court decisions on freedom of the press as "clearly
libertarian in spirit and effect." H. NELSON, FREEDOM OFTHE PRESS FROM HAMILTON TO THE WARREN
CoURT xxxvii (1967).
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., considered the 1920's and 1930's central to the building of a framework for
freedom of the press. Of the Court's work in those years, he wrote: "It is not just a question of
particular situations. Through them all runs a new philosphy of the importance of open discussion in
American life, which stems from the great dissent of Justice Holmes in Abrams v. United States." Z.
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restraint prior to publication was held to be unconstitutional. 3 The freedom to publish was elaborated into a freedom to distribute the products of
publication. 4 Moreover, the protection was held to include pamphlets and
leaflets, the medium characteristic of society's dissidents, as well as the
newspapers, books and magazines of the commercial media. 5 The imposition of taxes to punish publishers was deemed as abhorrent as outright
government censorship. 6 Moreover, the Court proceeded steadily on the
assumption it had made first in 1925, in Gitlow v. New York, 7 that liberty
of the press was among the cluster of liberties protected from invasion by
the states under the fourteenth amendment.
The radical speech cases in World War I had forced the Supreme Court
to concentrate on finding a workable test of the limits of government
power to punish speech. Dissenters fell victim to stiff antisedition legislation, enforced willingly in the courts. However, in distinction to the
widespread punishment of radical speech, the Supreme Court moved
away in its deliberations from the "reasonable tendency" test, 8 which
one scholar termed "capable of ensnaring the most innocent speech," 9 to
the "clear and present danger test" enunciated by Justice Holmes in
Schenck v. United States: "The question in every case is whether the
words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent." 10 The test was to prove far
more circumscribed than its libertarian admirers expected, but it did
clearly credit a presumption of a right to speak to the voices of the day.
The spirit of freedom conveyed by the test, and by its eloquent declarations by the Court, was muted by zealous suppression of speech in the
period. 1 The Court, unfortunately, consistently followed its declaration
in Gitlow v. New York: "This freedom does not deprive a State of the
CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH INTHE UNITED STATES 437 (1941). Paul L. Murphy termed 1931, the year

of the Near v. Minnesota decision, "the quiet and subtle beachhead of a new era. In fact, 1931 was a
major turning point toward a new type of judicial instrumentalism in civil liberties in which the judiciary came to take the lead in opening up new federally guaranteed channels to assure formerly helpless Americans a new opportunity to utilize their constitutionally guaranteed rights." P. MURPHY,
THE MEANING OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH 8 (1972).

3. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
4. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
5. Id. at 450-51.
6. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
7. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
8. Z. CHAFEE, JR., supra note 2, at 50 (citing Masses Publ. Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24, 39 (2d Cir.
1917)).
9.

H. NELSON, supranote 2, at xxv.

10. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
11. See Z. CHAFEE, JR., supra note 2, at 36-354, for a detailed history of state and federal
prosecutions of political dissent during the war and in the years shortly after.

Deceptive 'Right to Know'
primary and essential right of self-preservation; which so long as human
2
governments endure, they cannot be denied." 1
The events of the day obscure the steadiness of the Court's view of the
political role of the press. In 1927, Justice Brandeis articulated the
assumptions which he contended underlay first amendment interpretations by the Court in that decade: "Those who won our independence
believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to develop
their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces should
prevail over the arbitrary. '13 The freedom to "think as you will and to
speak as you think" was essential to the search for political truth. Freedom of speech necessarily churned some falsity and error into the public
discussion, but that did not warrant government efforts to prevent or punish falsity. "If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehoods
and fallacies, to avert evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be
applied is more speech, not enforced silence."' 14 Brandeis argued that
suppression took its greatest toll on the individual, and then, as a consequence, on the society.
[The founders of the nation] knew that order cannot be secured merely
through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable govemment; that the path of
safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.
Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they
eschewed silence coerced by law-the argument of force in its worst form.
Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they
amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed. 15
The Court applied the first amendment unevenly in the decade after the
war, but its view was fixed consistently on the claims of speakers for
protection under the Constitution.
II.

FREE EXPRESSION IN THE POSTWAR YEARS

In the years after World War II troublesome new ideas about the relationship of press and citizen took form outside the Court and worked their

12. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,668 (1925).
joined by Holmes, J., con13. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
curring).
14. Id. at 377.
15. Id. at 375-76 (footnotes omitted).
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way into judicial consciousness. By the 1960's, these ideas were shaping
Court responses in significant areas of first amendment interpretation.
Of the many currents of intellectual change in the postwar years, four
sources are examined here. Each contributes some germ of the ideas manifest in the recent Supreme Court free press decisions. No single idea or
theory has been adopted wholesale, but the influence is evident nevertheless. The first source is the significant reconception of the role of the press
completed by the Commission on Freedom of the Press in 1947.16 What
the commission propounded essentially as a warning to the press was
developed in a parallel legal theory at the same time by the teacher and
philosopher, Alexander Meiklejohn. His extraordinarily influential lectures, published as Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government, 17
are the second source. Third, ideas about relative rights of the press and
its audience were emerging from administrative experience in the one
realm of the press where the government had unchallenged freedom to
regulate-broadcasting. Finally, the Court itself in the postwar years
began to speak differently about the listener in this society and his place
in the scheme of the first amendment.
In its formal report, the Commission presented standards of performance for the press and warned that the value of an adequately informed
citizenry was so great that the government would be justified in meeting
needs not adequately served by the press itself. The call was temperate; it
simply urged the media to offset the adverse consequences of their great
economic power by showing greater social responsibility. The Commission's proposal for government involvement was little more than recognition of the changes in government activities in the depression and war
years:
Nor is there anything in the First Amendment or in our political tradition to
prevent the government from participating in mass communications: to state
its own case, to supplement private sources of information and to propose
standards for private emulation. Such participation by government is not
dangerous to the freedom of the press. 18
Press irritation at this apparent endorsement of the government's developing relationship to the media distracted attention from the underlying reason for the proposal. It was the malaise of the citizenry that alarmed the
Commission. The rational man of the Enlightenment was an unrealistic
model for the confused and self-interested citizen of the postwar years,
COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OFTHE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS (1947).
A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948), reprinted in
A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLmCAL FREEDOM (1960).
16.

17.
18.

COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 16, at 81.
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wrote William Hocking in a Commission document: 19 "The democracy
of mental participation by the people in the main lines of public action
runs shallow.' '20 The times demanded the citizen's active interest, Hocking wrote, but the citizen was unwilling to engage in difficult thinking.
Moreover, the institutions of family, school, church, and the press had
failed to give Americans the support "needed for carrying out their citizen duties. When these free authorities are weak or absent, the weaker
truth-seekers may so far flounder as to set up a prima facie case for a
reversion to authoritative control, to the loss of that mental power on
which social progress depends.'"21 Zechariah Chafee, Jr. was as pessimistic at the outset of his review of first amendment law, Government and
Mass Communications:
Today there is reason to suppose that the self correcting process, although
commonly considered to function fully, does not in fact function, to our
danger.... There are no such natural harmonies and balances in a community as democratic theory used to assume. .

.

. Our people have put too

much trust in the automatic tendencies of our society to right itself. We have
found that we cannot depend on unmanaged processes, whether in econom22
ics or in communications.
The Commission exhorted the media to improve their performance,
and considered ways that government might inspire, but not enforce, such
improvement. Despite its doubts about the political system, the Commission kept its faith that freedom of speech and press had to be assured.
"Valuable ideas may be put forth first in forms that are crude, indefensible, or even dangerous. They need the chance to develop through free
criticism as well as the chance to survive on the basis of their ultimate
worth. Hence the man who publishes ideas requires special protection. "23 Then the Commission pondered how the government was to act
toward speaker and listener. Both, after all, shaped the public discourse
and served the ends of a vital community. The conclusion was artful:
"Hence it is that, although there are these two direct interests, only one of
them, in simple conditions, needs protection. To protect the freedom of
the issuer is to protect the interest of the consumer and in general that of
the community also.' '24 If changing conditions warranted some degree of
interest in the consumer, the Commission suggested encouragement of
19.

W. HocKING, FREEDOM OFTHF PRESS: A FRAMEWORK OF PRINCIPLE (1947).

20. Id. at 18.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 96.
Z. CHAFEE, JR. I GOVERNMENTAND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 26-27 (1947).
CoMMissioN ON FREEDOM OFT E PRFSS, supra note 16, at 6.
Id. at 112 (emphasis in the original).
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greater access to the press. It did not propose framing new first amendment rights around the interests of listeners and readers.
Hocking, disillusioned about the malaise of the citizens, leaned further
than the Commission toward shaping mass communication to compensate
for that indifference. "With the rights of editors and publishers to express
themselves there must be associated a right of the public to be served with
a substantial and honest basis of fact for its judgments of public affairs. '25
The phrase, "right of the public" was ill chosen. Hocking's zest for a
new approach to political communication had led him to infer from the
1945 Supreme Court decision in Associated Press v. United States26 that
the Court had set about to create a new level of protection for consumers
of news. The decision, which upheld an antitrust prosecution of the Associated Press news service cooperative, had concluded only that the first
amendment did not bar such regulation of the press.
But Hocking wondered if much more could be read into the decision.
"It is not clear from the opinions in this case how far the Court is prepared to go beyond this somewhat negative obligation of government to
restrain restraints on the free flow of ideas. Is it preparedto uphold positive standards of performance?"' 27 As Hocking, the philosopher, interpreted the law, public welfare assumed a place of such importance that
the idea of free speech must yield. "Originally, freedom of speech and
press were liberties which chiefly concerned individuals who had opinions to utter; today their readers and hearers, the consumers of opinion,
are equally concerned." 28 Detached from the practicalities of both journalism and the courts, Hocking was unable to sense the difficulties should
the courts ever try to uphold "positive standards of performance" for the
press.
Alexander Meiklejohn also sensed the forces reshaping the postwar
conception of freedom, and conceived a philosophical retreat that brilliantly answered the pessimism of the Commission on Freedom of the
Press. He argued for absolute protection of speech that contributed to
self-governance. Unlike Hocking, whose tolerance for free speech did not
include calculated falsehoods, Meiklejohn wanted no such curb on political speech, whatever its motive or nature.
Shall we give a hearing to those who hate and despise freedom, to those
who, if they had the power, would destroy our institutions? Certainly, yes!
Our action must be guided, not by their principles, but by ours. We listen,
25.

W. HOCKING, supra note 19, at 169.

26.
27.
28.

326 U.S. 1(1945).
W. HOCKING, supra note 19, at 52-53 (emphasis added).
Id. at 172.
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not because they desire to speak, but because we need to hear. If there are
arguments against our theory of government, our policies in war or in
peace, we the citizens, the rulers, must hear and consider them for ourselves. That is the way of public safety. It is the program of self-govern29
ment.
It was the need of the voter for information and discussion that warranted the state's protection of speakers. The protection was not for the
speaker, but for political ideas, and this more than anything else reflected
the new philosophical basis of the first amendment. "What is essential is
not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be
30
said."
The advocacy of absolute freedom in political matters camouflaged
Meiklejohn's interest in controlled political discussion. He used the
model of the town meeting approvingly to show how actions of a moderator, including the setting of agendas, prevention of redundant speeches
and balancing of presentations, contributed to the quality of discussion.
Such interventions were warranted, he said, because "the point of ultimate interest is not the words of the speakers, but the minds of the hearers. The final aim of the meeting is the voting of wise decisions.' '31 To
make the "wise decisions" that were the essence of self-government, the
voter had to hear all possible ideas and opinions. If state action denied
him any ideas pertinent to his political duty, that action was proscribed by
the first amendment. But that amendment posed no barrier to the state
playing a moderator's role. It was necessary for the state to so act if communication was to serve "the thinking process of the community. "32
Meiklejohn's desire to protect political speech in the interests of selfgovernance was warranted at the time and is today. His choice of the
town meeting analogy was hopeful, but unrealistic. The process by which
Americans informed themselves of their world, punctuated as it was by
occasional trips by some of them to polling places, was in no sense equivalent to the structured political participation of persons in a town meeting.
Yet Meiklejohn argued that the mass communication system should respond to the one as though it were the other.
Speech that did not contribute to governance was private, and merited a
different order of protection. "[T]he First Amendment has other work to
do," Meiklejohn wrote. 33 "It has no concern about the 'needs of many
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

A. MEIt.EoHN, supranote 17, at 57.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 55.
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men to express their opinions.' ',34 Those needs were private matters and
the resulting speech could be denied on occasion, as long as due process
was satisfied. 35 Yet, did not self-govemance depend simply on the
"needs of many men to express their opinions"?
Meiklejohn rightly distinguished kinds of speech according to the degree of protection each should be accorded. "The constitutional status of
a merchant advertising his wares, of a paid lobbyist fighting for the advantage of his client, is utterly different from that of a citizen who is
planning for the general welfare.' '36
But it was not clear how political speech was to be distinguished from
those purely private kinds of expression, a confusion that Meiklejohn created in subsequent commentaries. In the original presentation of his theory, the voter was at the center of his view of political communication,
but the realm of communication that was protected was obviously much
broader than matters that pertained to pending elections. What was protected, he said in 1948, was discussion of public issues. But in 1961,
when a student of Meiklejohn's philosophy asserted that "novels, or dra37
mas or paintings or poems" were not relevant to the political process,
Meiklejohn objected: "[T]he people do need novels and dramas and
paintings and poems, 'because they will be called upon to vote.' -38 In
theory, then, political speech might encompass much of what is communicated to the public, a broad definition that would free courts from making
difficult decisions. But Meiklejohn's own waffling on the breadth of
speech that merited absolute protection was reflected in, if not a cause of,
the Supreme Court's own wide-ranging application of the first amendment in subsequent libel decisions.
The Meiklejohnian heritage includes both a reverence for political
speech, and the harmful notion that mass communication should be regulated in order to give the citizen information to prepare him for the task of
voting. That preparation had previously been assumed to be the consequence of a society in which citizens spoke freely; Meiklejohn encouraged those architects of the brave new world who felt that the survival of
the nation could not be left to chance.
The idea of regulated mass communication was more than a philosophical exercise in the late 1940's, however. Within a year after Meiklejohn's lectures first were published, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), appeared to be applying his own town meeting analogy to
34.
35.

Id.
Id.

36.

Id. at 37.

37.
38.

Kalven, Metaphysics ofthe Law ofObsceni', 1960 Sup. CT. REV. I, 15-16.
Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REv. 245, 263.
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the nation's commercial broadcasting system. In 1949, the FCC reversed
its 1941 prohibition of licensee editorial advocacy and formulated its two
pronged "fairness doctrine."
This requires that licensees devote a reasonable percentage of their broadcasting time to the discussion of public issues of interest in the community
served by their stations and that such programs be designed so that the public has a reasonable opportunity to hear different opposing positions on the
39
public issues of interest and importance in the community.
Although concern for the "public interest" was expressed as early as
1927 in the Federal Radio Act, 4° the FCC articulated that interest in terms
remarkably similar to those used by Meiklejohn. Although the right of
free speech was not to be impaired by FCC regulation, broadcasters were
told that the publicly owned airwaves were dedicated to helping citizens
form opinions on public issues. With approval and emphasis, the Commission quoted from a congressional debate on passage of the Radio Act:
"If enacted into law, the broadcasting privilege will not be a right of selfishness. It will rest upon an assurance of public interest to be served.'"41
Of course, it was alarm about commercial selfishness that motivated the
Act and the subsequent actions of the FCC, but the Commission, in justifying its fairness requirements, paid little attention to the value of selfish
opinions, or ideas. "[T]he needs and interests of the general public...
can only be satisfied by making available to them for their consideration
and acceptance or rejection, of varying and conflicting views held by responsible elements of the community.' '42
But even as the Commission instituted its version of a Meiklejohnian
mass communication system, the philosopher himself was despairing of
the futility of the effort, at least in radio.
But never was a human hope more bitterly disappointed. The radio as it
now operates among us is not free. Nor is it entitled to the protection of the
First Amendment. It is not engaged in the task of enlarging and enriching
human communication. It is engaged in making money. And the First
Amendment does not intend to guarantee men freedom to say what some
private interest pays them to say for its own advantage. It intends only to
make men free to say what, as citizens, they think, what they believe, about
the general welfare. 43
39. In re Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1257-58 (1949) (quoting 67
CONG. REc. 5479 (1926)).

40.
41.
CONG.
42.
43.

Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169,44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (repealed 1934).
In re Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1248 n.1 (1949) (quoting 67
REc. 5479 (1926)).
Id. at 1247.
A. MEmxioHN, supranote 17, at 87.
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The government, however, was trying to compensate for the obvious
faults of a private system by enforcing standards of conduct intended to
serve an idealized voter. The experiment demonstrated the considerable
difference between the conduct of a closely knit corporate body of the
type described by Meiklejohn in his discussion of town meetings and that
disparate, divided, partially disinterested body called the nation.
Listener interests also attracted the attention of the Supreme Court in
the 1940's, but without any substantial reduction in the protection afforded to speakers. The Court acknowledged that the right to speak implied there was a listener. But the Justices joined the spirit of the times in
finding new interests and value in those previously unrecognized listeners.
Cases in point are two Jehovah's Witnesses decisions of the mid1940's. In Martin v. City of Struthers,44 the Court reaffirmed the right to
distribute religious literature by invalidating an Ohio ordinance that forbade knocking, ringing doorbells or otherwise summoning occupants of a
house to the door. Without further comment, Justice Black wrote that the
freedom to distribute literature "necessarily protects the right to receive
it. "45 Two years later, in Marsh v. Alabama, Justice Black, again writing
for the majority, elaborated: "[A]nd we have recognized that the preservation of a free society is so far dependent upon the right of each individual citizen to receive such literature as he himself might desire that a mun46
icipality could not" prohibit door-to-door distribution.
The decisions served to exalt the speaking rights of the Jehovah's Witnesses, and thus echoed traditional first amendment values. Yet the protection was linked to previously unconsidered rights to receive information, and the door was opened to elaboration and confusion of that idea.
The cases asserted simply that the "right to receive information" implied no limit of any kind on the speaker or publisher of the information:
It was a derivative right appropriately encompassed by the first amendment. 47 The Court reasoned similarly when it invalidated a state law requiring registration of union organizers: The law abridged both kinds of
rights, the organizers' rights to speak and the rights of the workers to hear
what organizers had to say. 48 At issue was a vote for union representa44. 319U.S. 141 (1943).
45. Id. at 143.
46. 326 U.S. 501, 505 (1945).
47. See also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (state cannot make "mere private
possession of obscene material a crime"); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen. of United States, 381 U.S. 301
(1965) (statute permitting the government to require addressee's affirmative request for "communist
propaganda" held unconstitutional). Both cases recognized a right to receive information, but neither
cast the right in terms of a control on the content of the communication.
48. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1944).
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tion, a problem analogous to that advanced by Meiklejohn as the most
obvious sort of protected speech, and the Court affirmed the workers'
rights to "discuss and be informed concerning this choice.' ,49
But did the right to be informed imply any control on the speaker, any
responsibility to speak in a certain way or to speak truthfully? Justice
Jackson said emphatically that it did not:
But it cannot be the duty, because it is not the right, of the state to protect
the public against false doctrine. The very purpose of the First Amendment
is to foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public
mind through regulating the press, speech, and religion. In this field every
person must be his own watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not
trust any government to separate the true from the false for us.... As I read
their intentions, this liberty was protected because they knew of no other
50
way by which free men could conduct representative democracy.
The legacy of the 1940's was the emergence of an idea that one element
in the constitutional theory of freedom of the press is the interest of the
public or the citizen in receiving information. The Supreme Court had
begun to express this troublesome doctrine as it listened to influential
legal and philosophical arguments of the time. Moreover, a federal
agency entrusted with authority over an increasingly powerful medium of
public communication was using a concept of listener rights as the basis
for mandating the airing of balanced political opinions.
III.

THE REFEREED DEBATE OF THE 1960's AND 1970's

The intellectual ferment of the 1940's, and the discovery of first
amendment rights (albeit vague ones) for listeners, influenced a series of
important Supreme Court decisions in the 1960's and 1970's. The Justices gave legal life to concepts heretofore strictly philosophical, and in so
doing, changed or extended the original form of the ideas. More important, the law developed in at least two directions, which will be referred
to here as the Debate Model and the Right-to-Know Model. In these
years, members of the Court fashioned two interpretations of first amendment rights which are not only widely divergent, but indeed, totally incompatible with one another. These interpretations stand as monuments
to "the dangers that beset us when we lose sight of the First Amendment
itself, and march forth in blind pursuit of its 'values.' "51
49. Id. at 534.
50. Id. at 545-46.
51. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 145 (1973)
(Stewart, J.,
concurring).
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The DebateModel

A.

Meiklejohn's concern for a properly informed electorate surfaced most
clearly in the Supreme Court's 1964 decision, New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan. 52 Meiklejohn himself praised the case, saying, "[i]t is an occasion for dancing in the streets." 53 Like Meiklejohn, Justice Brennan
stressed the need and value of debate of public issues to produce an
informed populace and electorate. In 1964, the Court sought to safeguard
that debate by providing extensive-but not absolute-legal protection
from defamation actions for those disseminating information and opinion
about public officials.
The case evolved from a 1960 advertisement in the New York Times,
which charged that the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. faced harassment, imprisonment, and perhaps even death because of his crusade for
black civil rights. A number of Southern officials sued the New York
Times for libel, and L.B. Sullivan, one of Montgomery, Alabama's three
city commissioners, won $500,000 against the Times in Alabama, a verdict upheld by that state's supreme court. 54 The Supreme Court overturned the judgment and echoed Meiklejohn's philosophy by emphasizing
55
the need for public discussion of public issues.
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, reviewed the history of libel
and sedition in America, and found "a profound national commitment"
to the principle of "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on public
issues. 56 Such debate, he wrote, "may well include vehement, caustic,
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials," but this debate was nonetheless crucial "to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be
obtained by lawful means. 57 The statement at issue in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan concerned civil rights, a topic of major controversy, and
thus deserved first amendment protection: "The present advertisement, as
an expression of grievance and protest on one of the major public issues
of our time, would seem clearly to qualify for the constitutional protection." 58 To emphasize the necessity of public debate, the Court acknowledged that even error merits some constitutional protection. Justice Bren52. 376 U.S. 254(1964).
53. Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the FirstAmendment, 79
HARV. L. REv. 1, 17 (1965) (citing Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central
Meaning of the FirstAmendment," 1964 SuP. CT. REv. 191, 221 n. 125).

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
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New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964).
Id. at 270, 292.
Id. at 270.
Id. at 269-70.
Id. at 271.
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nan wrote that "erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate" and
insisted that "it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to
have the 'breathing space' that they 'need to survive.' -s9 A rule of absolute truth in public debate "dampens the vigor and limits the variety of
public debate.''60 The Court was unwilling to accept all error, however,
and excluded deliberately or recklessly false statements from constitutional protection. 61 The marketplace of ideas was not completely free
from control.
Significantly, Justice Brennan valued free speech and press not as individual rights of self-expression but as contributions to proper governance.
The New York Times advertisement "communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought
financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives
were matters of the highest public interest and concern." 62 And Justice
Brennan contended, "[t]he general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment has long
been settled by our decisions . . . 'to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people.' "63 As Brennan stressed, the "protection of the public" requires
full discussion and information. 64
Three aspects of the New York Times case would figure prominently in
the future. First, although only the speaker received special legal protection, the majority opinion acknowledged that listener interests constituted
a vital ingredient in public debate; "free" speech, of necessity, thus included the listener as well as the speaker. Second, the Court introduced a
new fault requirement: Public officials (the obvious targets of criticism in
public debate) must show that the press acted with knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard of the truth. 65 Some error could be tolerated, but lying
and reckless reporting would threaten the integrity of the debate and thus
the listener would not receive information vital to good governance. Such
59. Id. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,433 (1963)).
60. Id. at 279.
61. Id. at 279-80. The actual malice rule required that public officials prove knowledge of
.falsity or reckless disregard of the truth.
62. Id. at266 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 269 (quoting Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476,484 (1957)).
64. Id. at 272 (quoting Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1942)) (emphasis
added).
65. Justice Hugo Black assailed the new fault requirement:
"Malice," even as defined by the Court, is an elusive, abstract concept, hard to prove and hard
to disprove. The requirement that malice be proved provides at best an evanescent protection for
the right critically to discuss public affairs and certainly does not measure up to the sturdy safeguard embodied in the First Amendment.
Id. at 293 (Black, J., concurring).
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a provision would necessitate scrutiny of the behavior of individual journalists, and thus entail examination of the news process. The attempt to
impose a measure of purity on the public debate added controls far more
stringent than those of Meiklejohn, but the new fault standard was a logical development due to the Court's concern for the listener. Listeners had
no need for-indeed, they would be harmed by-irresponsible speakers.
Third, the words "public debate" were not self-defining. Was the public
debate in the New York Times case acceptable because the justices sympathized with the civil rights movement? 66 And, most important, what
did the listener need to know to assure proper governance?
The progeny of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan follow the same basic
commitment to freedom of speech and press as part of a larger goal of
proper governance. Speech and press are weighed and valued according
to their ability to promote that goal, and the parties in libel suits are categorized according to the degrees and nature of their involvement in public
67
debate.
This process of weighing speech with societal interest in good government led to an increasing involvement of the Court in the operations of
the press, as demonstrated in 1966 by CurtisPublishingCo. v. Butts (and
66. There were political overtones to the case, as Harry Kalven, Jr., notes. "'Alabama somehow
pounced on this opportunity to punish the Times for its role in supporting the civil rights movement in
the South." Kalven, supra note 53, at 200. The Court, sympathetic to the civil rights struggle, and
desirous of helping the Times in face of financial ruin, sought a pro-press decision and thus had to
derive a rationale for it. "One problem among the many that the Court faces in cases of this kind is
attributable to the fact that it cannot, like the man in the street, simply state the result that it likes."
Id.
At least seventeen civil libel actions by public officials of the Southern states were pending against
the media in April, 1964. H. NELSON, supra note 2, at 98.
Compare New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) with cases in which the Court has
denied protection to political expression with which it did not sympathize. E.g., Wolston v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979) (plaintiff accused of being a Soviet agent); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (John Birch Society publication accused lawyer of being a "Leninist" and a "Communist-fronter").
67. Public officials include public employees who "have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs." Rosenblatt v. Baer,
383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). In Curtis Publ. Co. v. Butts and its companion case, Associated Press v.
Walker, the Court applied the higher fault standard to public "figures," that is, those who by their
"purposeful activity" thrust themselves into the " 'vortex' of an important public controversy."
Public figures, like public officials, "had sufficient access to the means of counterargument to be able
'to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies' of the defamatory statements." Curtis
Pub]. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). See generally Comment, Defamation and the First
Amendment: ProtectingSpeech on Public Issues, 56 WASH. L. REv. 75 (1980).
The Court consistently stressed the importance of debate in informing the public. In CurtisPubl.
Co. v. Butts, Justice Harlan declared that free speech "is as much a guarantee to individuals of their
personal right to make their thoughts public and put them before the community ...as it is a social
necessity required for the 'maintenance of our political system and an open society.' " 388 U.S. 130,
149 (1967). See also Greenbelt Coop. Publ. Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 11-12 (1970); St. Amant
v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1968).
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its companion case, Associated Press v. Walker).68 The major issue in
these cases was defining public officials or public figures, but the added
dimension of particular importance here derives from the Court's attention to the fault standard first devised in New York Times.
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, the Saturday Evening Post had
accused University of Georgia athletic director Wally Butts of fixing a
Georgia-Alabama football game; in Associated Press v. Walker, the
Associated Press carried stories indicating that Walker had led segregationist rioters. 69 In reviewing both cases, the Court analyzed the process involved in news gathering.
Writing for a plurality of four, Justice Harlan cited impermissible any
"extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.' '70 What followed was nothing less than a wholesale critique for the Post's news process. According to Justice Harlan, the Butts story "was in no sense 'hot news'," elementary precautions and important sources had been ignored, the Post
writer did not know enough about football, and the magazine's attitude
was poor.7 1 On the other hand, the Associated Press reporter in Walker
apparently suffered from no such character failings; by judicial fiat the
stories were "hot news" which was presented in good faith and thus
served the listener well. Chief Justice Warren, although disagreeing with
the plurality's "extreme departure" standard, upheld the examination of
the news process by endorsing the "reckless disregard" standard from
New York Times. 72 A majority clearly favored scrutiny of the news process to guarantee the purity of the public debate.
Such excursions into the newsroom, and into the thoughts, knowledge
or attitude of individual reporters are fraught with problems. Almost a
half century earlier, Justice Brandeis argued: "Courts are ill equipped to
make the investigations which should precede a determination of the limitations which should be set upon any property right in news or of the
circumstances under which news gathered by a private agency should be
deemed affected with a public interest." '73 Justice Brandeis wanted the
Court to eschew such involvement in the news process, and argued that
the courts would be "powerless" to create adequate standards or to create
the "machinery required for enforcement of such regulations." He urged
68.

388 U.S. 130(1967).

69. Id. at 135-40.
70. Id. at 155.
71. See id. at 157-58.
72. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
73. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 267 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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judicial restraint: "Considerations such as these should lead us to decline
to establish a new rule of law in the effort to redress a newly disclosed
wrong, although the propriety of some remedy appears to be clear.' '74
Justice Black's dissent in Curtis and Walker echoes the Brandeis concern
that courts should not meddle in the news process.
If this precedent is followed, it means that we must in all libel cases hereafter weigh the facts and hold that all papers and magazines guilty of gross
writing or reporting are constitutionally liable, while they are not if the quality of the reporting is approved by a majority of us ...
It strikes me that the Court is getting itself in the same quagmire in the
field of libel in which it is now helplessly struggling in the field of
obscenity. . .. In fact, the Court is suggesting various experimental

expedients in libel cases, all of which boil down to a determination of how
offensive to this Court a particular libel judgment may be, either because of
its immense size or because the Court does not like the way an alleged libelee was treated. 75
In the 1970's, the Court followed the basic patterns established in the
1960's cases, although disputes arose over the definition of public debate.
Just how much information-and on what topics-did the informed listener need? In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., a plurality of the Court
provided the broadest definition of acceptable public debate. 76 That
77
breadth evaporated three years later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
when the Court turned away from the expanding Meiklejohnian concept
of definition of public issues and instead endorsed a truncated Meiklejohnian view reminiscent of that expressed in Curtis and Walker. Justice
Powell, writing for the Court, narrowed the definition of public figure:
Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a public figure
through no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare. For the most part those who
attain this status have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of
society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that
74. Id.
75. 388 U.S. 130, 171-72 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting). Attorney James C. Goodale, onetime
vice-president of the New York Times, writes:
If the courts recognize the right to know, however, they will begin to perform the function of
gathering information. They will also act as editors, since only the courts can apply the qualifications inherent in the right to know. Editing will require judgments about what information to
release to the public and what to withhold. The right to communicate will thus be affected, since
one cannot communicate what has been withheld.
Goodale, Legal Pitfallsin the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 29, 32.
76. 403 U.S. 29, 42 (1971). The plurality would have expanded the defense provided to speakers
by allowing them to erect the actual malice defense against all persons involved in issues of great
concern or controversy to the listener. Id. at 43.
77. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those

classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular
public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues
78
involved. In either event, they invite attention and comment.
79
The Supreme Court has followed the Gertz decision in three cases.
These cases provide no new discussion on the Debate Model itself, and
generally provide no new criteria for status of public figure other than
what can be found in Gertz. Their significance is in their narrow construction of public concern; in all three cases, libel plaintiffs were construed by
the Court to be private figures. The public had no need for information
about them.
In one late 1970's case, the Court returned to an examination of the
news process. Herbert v. Lando80 grew out of a libel suit by Lt. Col.
Anthony Herbert against CBS, for a report on "Sixty Minutes," and Jack
Lando, the show's producer, for an Atlantic Monthly magazine article.
78. Id. at 345. The end of strict liability was not a particular protection for the press; rather, it
was a device to protect and nurture public debate. As Justice Powell writes, "[t]he First Amendment
requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters." Id. at 341.
79. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443
U.S. 111 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, the Court ruled that a sensational divorce case was not a public controversy as envisioned in the concept of public debate. Justice Rehnquist wrote, for the majority, that the
"details of many, if not most, courtroom battles would add almost nothing toward advancing the
uninhibited debate on public issues thought to provide principal support for the decision in New York
Times." 424 U.S. at 457. This sweeping statement differed greatly from recent precedents by the
Court, and pointed out the great variability-and thus, instability-in definitions of what constituted
acceptable topics for public debate.
Only one year before Time, Inc. v. Firestone, Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469
(1975), held that court records were of interest to the public:
In the first place, in a society in which each individual has but limited time and resources with
which to observe at first hand the operations of his government, he relies necessarily upon the
press to bring to him in convenient form the facts of those operations. Great responsibility is
accordingly placed upon the news media to report fully and accurately the proceedings of government, and official records and documents open to the public are the basic data of governmental operations. Without the information provided by the press, most of us and many of our representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to register opinions on the administration of
government generally. With respect to judicial proceedings in particular, the function of the
press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and to bring to bear the beneficial effects of public
scrutiny upon the administration of justice.
420 U.S. at 491-92.
Cox BroadcastingCorp. v. Cohn dealt with reporting of a criminal case, and Time, Inc. v. Firestone was a civil case. But are only criminal cases of public concern? Could not civil libel suits, such
as those against the New York Times in the early 1960's, demonstrate the attempts of some to bankrupt one of the nation's leading papers because it supported the civil rights movement? Obviously,
such a suit would be part of a bona fide public debate. The point is not that the gossip reported in
Time, Inc. v. Firestone merits protection; rather, the point is that the yardstick by which the Court
measures bona fide public issues and events is invisible; it is as likely to rest on a personal whim as on
philosophy.
80. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
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Herbert sought extensive pretrial discovery to ascertain whether the defendants had acted with actual malice. In so doing, he asked a large number of questions regarding the news process. Defendants sought to shut
off the discovery process, arguing for a limited constitutional protection
81
of the news process from invasion.
The Herbertmajority rejected the defendants' argument and ruled that
state of mind and other aspects of the news process always had been involved in the fault standard of New York Times. 82 That case based the
press right to print not on the individual speaker's first amendment rights,
but on the good of society and public debate. Well-behaved reporters
were just one ingredient of a well-run public debate; society would lose
much, the Court implied, from misbehavior.
In Herbert v. Lando, Justice White argued that the investigation into
the editorial process would only aid the reporter in pointing out good behavior when it occurred. 83 Such rosy views aside, the ruling allows courts
to make judgments about the reasonableness of the editorial process.
Four important assumptions underlie the Court's attitudes in the defamation cases. First, the Court majority has assumed that generally the
people (listeners) can make proper decisions based on wide-ranging, conflicting, and even false information. The actual malice rule excludes lies
from the marketplace, but honest error can be tolerated. By allowing debate and concomitant error, the Court has signalled some belief in the
public's ability to differentiate between truth and error. Second, the Court
consistently has viewed free speech and press not as a separate entity
deserving nurturing, but as part of a larger process; Justice Brennan and
others clearly see free speech and press as contributing to good government. Third, although the listener has no legal rights, his presence is quite
clear. Indeed, since the raison d'Otre of free speech and press is an informed listener, expression unrelated to government is entitled to only
limited protection. But the very difficulty in arriving at workable definitions of public speech-necessitated by such concern for the listenercompounds a difficult situation. Justice Brennan, invoking Meiklejohn,
writes: "Education in all its phases, the achievement of philosophy and
the sciences, literature and the arts, all fall within the subjects of 'governing importance' that the first amendment absolutely protects from
81. Id. at 157-58.
82. Id. at 160. Jerome A. Barron writes:
In short, it seems apparent that the workings of the New York Times actual malice test always
assumed the availability of inquiry into the state of mind on the part of the media defendant. If
that is true, then all that the Lando decision has done is to clarify the law on this point.
Barron, The Rise and Fall of a Doctrine of EditorialPrivilege:Reflections on Herbert v. Lando, 47
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1002, 1016 (1976).
83. 441 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1979).
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abridgement. "84 But the Court has construed public speech much more
narrowly than would Justice Brennan, especially since Gertz. In compar86
ing Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 85 with Hutchinson v. Proxmire
and Wolston v. Reader's DigestAssociation,87 the great latitude the Court
possesses indefining public speech becomes quite clear. In reality, the
protection for the speaker behind the actual malice defense may be deep,
but it is nonetheless quite narrow. Fourth, the actual malice standard may
be a Pandora's box; the malice standard appears at first to protect a
speaker's rights, but it also invites close scrutiny and evaluation of the
speaker's behavior and attitude by the courts.
B.

The Right-to-Know Model

The second model of free speech and press differs greatly from the
Debate Model. While the Debate Model, under Meiklejohn's influence,
indirectly recognized that listeners had needs and particular interests, and
some type of vaguely defined nonlegal "rights," only in the Right-toKnow Model are the listener's rights legally binding and the rights of the
speaker circumscribed. A problem arises, howvever, in adjudicating the
new-found legal status of listener vis-h-vis speaker. Here the marketplace
is invaded by a third party with additional interests: the governmental
agency.

1.

Broadcasting

Five years after New York Times, the Supreme Court dealt with broadcast regulation in reviewing the FCC's Fairness Doctrine in the landmark
case, Red Lion Broadcastingv. FCC.88 As in New York Times, the Court
stressed the importance of wide-ranging debate on public issues. Justice
White, for the majority, wrote that the goal of the first amendment was
"producing an informed public capable of conducting its own affairs." 89
"Vigorous debate of controversial issues of importance and concern to
the public" was central to the public interest. 90 Justice White also invoked the theme of the marketplace of ideas: "It is the purpose of the
84.
85.
86.
87.

Brennan,
403 U.S.
443 U.S.
443 U.S.

supra note 53, at 13.
29 (1971). See note 76 and accompanying text supra.
111 (1979). See note 79 and accompanying text supra.
157 (1979). See note 79 and accompanying text supra.

88. 395.U.S. 367(1969).
,89. Id. at 392.
90. Id. at 385.
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First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in
which truth will ultimately prevail.' '91
Despite these pious assertions of commitment to public discussion and
to the marketplace of ideas, the majority in Red Lion departed from the
philosophy of New York Times. Justice White gave paramount importance not to the speaker, but to the listener; he reduced the freedom of the
speaker dramatically and cast doubt on the existence and value of the traditional concept of the marketplace of ideas. In Red Lion, the Court wrote
into law the long-standing interests of the audience and gave these interests not equality but preeminence over those of the speaker:
But the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and
their collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends
and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and
92
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters,which is paramount.

The interests of the listeners were of course, considered and valued in
New York Times, its progeny, and even in 1940's thought. None of these,
however, elevated the listener to legal dominance. Red Lion magnified
the listener's rights while concomitantly diminishing those of the speakers. Justice White noted that broadcasters had only the "temporary privilege" of using designated frequencies and that even then there was little
latitude for action. 93 A licensee, he wrote, was nothing more than "a
proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices
which are representative of his community. . . . ,94 The renewal of a
broadcast license, or the granting of a new license, depends on the "willingness to present representative community views on controversial issues .

. . .

95 And the government itself, through the Federal Communi-

cations Commission, emerges as the so-called neutral umpire to enforce
96
society's interest in representative and fair programming.
The assumptions in Red Lion merit scrutiny, for they reveal the major
differences in the assumptions behind the Debate Model and the Right-toKnow Model. In New York Times and its progeny, the Court assumed
that some sort of a marketplace of ideas (albeit limited) existed, and that
protection of speakers' rights would help operation of the marketplace.
Implicit in the libel cases was a belief that members of the audience were
listening, and that they were probably intelligent enough to discern right
from wrong. Purposeful falsehood was excluded, but honest error could
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 390.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 394.
Id. at389.
Id. at 394.
Id. at 389.
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remain. Milton's argument that truth would indeed vanquish falsehood
seemed twisted since the Court insisted that purposeful lies and reckless
97
errors be excluded from the marketplace.
In Red Lion, the Court demonstrates little confidence in speakers or in
the ability of truth to succeed in its Miltonic battle with falsehood. As the
Court sees it, the marketplace of ideas cannot exist without some sort of
intervention by some agency such as the Federal Communications Commission. Indeed, as Justice White's majority opinion demonstrates,
broadcast regulation (and in particular, the Fairness Doctrine) is an attempt to create a marketplace where one does not already exist.
As Judge Bazelon argued three years later, the whole theory of regulation of broadcast content was wrongheaded. Dissenting in.BrandywineMain Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC,98 Judge Bazelon noted that a controversial
rightwing broadcaster, providing a unique (although one-sided, controversial, and venomous) service in a large metropolitan area, was denied a
license renewal because the programming at that one small station was
not balanced and fair. Never mind that the metropolitan area may have
lost those opinions altogether; never mind that another station in that metropolitan area might balance the right-wing station; never mind that enforcement of this artificial marketplace of ideas was actually excluding
ideas. Indeed, the FCC insisted that each station be balanced and fair, so
that the imaginary and fragile listener who heard only one station would
not be misled.
In Red Lion, there is no encouragement or belief in a free and unfettered exchange of ideas among thinking and rational persons. Broadcasters are required to be fair and balanced so that they do not deceive the
listening public. Such a rule casts doubt upon the ability of the listeners to
make their own rational decisions based on.the information before them,
and thus is incompatible with classic notions of the marketplace of ideas.
Despite the rhetoric of public debate and a marketplace of ideas, the majority in Red Lion rejects the concept of a marketplace and in effect denies
the public's ability to make rational decisions from the information placed
before it. Indeed, a third party emerges to referee the debate to assure that
all is fair and that the listener is not hurt. Milton's words could best be
rephrased: Truth would defeat error in an open contest so lQng as an umpire was present to require that there was a reasonable balance of opinion
disseminated.
97. J. MILTON, Areopagitica,in 4 WORKs 293, 347 (1931) ("And though all the windes of doctrin were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licencing and
prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the
wors, in a free and open encounter").
98. 473 F.2d 16, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
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Further attacks on the premise of the marketplace of ideas and on the
value of information freely exchanged came in Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. DemocraticNational Committee (CBS v. DNC). 99 Again,
the Court paid ritualistic attention to the need for public debate, and then
reiterated the Red Lion claim that the rights of the viewers and listeners
were paramount, not the rights of the broadcasters. 100 The Court continued to weigh speech issues in favor of the listener, the broadcaster still
was a public trustee or proxy who acted not in his own interests but in
those of the greater public. 101
The critical portion of CBS v. DNC, however, came when the Court
dealt with residual issues from Red Lion. Justice White's proclamation in
Red Lion that listeners' rights were paramount sparked some hope for a
right of access to broadcasting. The reasoning seemed logical: If listeners' rights were paramount, they should have some say in the content of
the medium. Nevertheless, in CBS v. DNC the Court rejected any such
right of access. The Court noted that members of the audience who seek
to take messages to other members of the audience, were neither the best
judges of the value of their own ideas or of the best way to present those
ideas. 102
Chief Justice Burger wrote, in the majority opinion, that broadcasters,
not members of the public, should determine which ideas will be broadcast. 103 The opinion was no endorsement of journalistic rights, however.
Rather, journalistic discretion was preserved because public access would
be chaotic and because listeners just did not have the ability to provide
thoughtful or intelligent expression of their own views.
Ironically, Chief Justice Burger invoked the "admonition of Professor
Alexander Meiklejohn that '[w]hat is essential is not that everyone shall
speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said . . . . ' 104 And so
the notion of the marketplace of ideas was further derogated by the Court:
Members of the audience had no clear idea what was best, even though
their interests were legally paramount. Broadcasters, whose interests
were subsidiary to those of the listening public, could act as proxies on
behalf of the myopic audience. And above these mere mortals was the
Federal Communications Commission, insisting that the proxies remain
99. 412 U.S. 94(1973).
100. Id. at 102 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)).
101. Id. at 135.
102. Id. at 124.
103. For better or worse, editing is what editors are for; and editing is selection and choice of
material. That editors-newspaper or broadcast-can and do abuse this power is beyond doubt, but
that is no reason to deny the discretion Congress provided. Calculated risks of abuse are taken in
order to preserve higher values. Id. at 124-25.
104. Id. at 122 (quoting A. MEIKLEJOHN, supranote 17, at 26.)

Deceptive 'Right to Know'
fair and thus not confuse the audience. As the Court noted, "determining
what best serves the public's right to be informed is a task of great delicacy and difficulty." 105 The result-particularly when the Court distrusts
the ability of the listener-is that the government becomes an overseer
and ultimate arbiter and guardian of the public interest.
In Red Lion, the Court ruled that listeners had a right to balanced information. And in CBS v. DNC, the Court expressed doubts about the ability
of the audience to perceive what was right. Five years later, in Federal
Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation,106 the Court displayed a continuing parental, almost condescending view, of the audience
by ruling that listeners must be protected from words that would shock or
offend them. Such protection represented a substantive departure from
the philosophy of a free marketplace with rational persons making rational decisions.
In PacificaFoundation, the majority denied that persons could discern
the value of George Carlin's commentary, "The Filthy Words," as
broadcast over a radio station. Justice Stevens argued that the monologue,
aired during early afternoon, could be heard by children and even
"unsuspecting adults." ' 107 The Court's duty was to protect these poor,
unsullied children and fragile adults from hearing "indecent" words.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, issued the ritual claim that "it
is a central tenet of the First Amendment that the government must
remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas."' 108 Then the Court declared
the words in Carlin's satire without value and excluded them from the
marketplace. 1°9 As Justice Brennan argued in dissent, the decision
"ignores the constitutionally protected interests of those who wish to
transmit." 1 10 The decision marked a profound paternalism on the part of
the Court.
2.

CommercialSpeech
The same parental guidance from a government agency arises in com105.
106.

Id. at 102.
438 U.S. 726 (1978).

107. Id. at 748-49.
108. Id. at 745-46.
109. "Patently offensive, indecent material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen,
not only in public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be left alone
plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder." 438 U.S. at 748. In its paternalism,
the majority of the Court imposed its own narrow view of acceptable speech upon both speaker
(broadcaster) and listener.
110. Id. at 764. Justice Brennan further noted the "depressing inability" of the Court "to appreciate that in our land of cultural pluralism, there are many who think, act, and talk differently from
the members of this Court, and who do not share their fragile sensibilities. It is only an acute ethno-
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mercial speech cases, which also protect listeners' rights at the expense of
speakers' rights.
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court agreed that ideas were
protected by the first amendment even when they appeared in advertising. III The advertisement in question, however, urged social and political
action; there was no commercial element in the message.
The distinction between commercial advertising and the communication of political ideas" 12 blurred in 1975 when the Court said that the first
amendment also shielded a brief advertisement in a Virginia weekly
3 In the advertisement, a New York women's agency offered
newspaper. 11
to counsel women about abortions and to assist in placing them in
accredited hospitals and clinics in New York. In Bigelow v. Virginia, the
Court invoked the first amendment because of the "public interest" ele114
ment.
"Public interest," however, did not justify protection of advertising if
the product or service offered was illegal in the place where it was
offered. The Court held that Virginia, whose laws forbade abortions,
could not punish for an advertisement of abortion services legally offered
in New York. The test of legality had been upheld as a substantial limit on
free speech two years earlier in PittsburghPress Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 15 a case involving classified employment
advertising-"classic examples of commercial speech." 116 The first
amendment, the Court said, does not prevent enforcement of an ordinance barring a newspaper from illegally classifying job ads according to
sex. 117 There was no question that the state could regulate the economic
activity of employment. But the advertisement of job opportunities had
centric myopia that enables the Court to approve the censorship of communications solely because of
the words they contain." 438 U.S. at 775 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
11l. An advertisement on behalf of Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., "communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support
on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and
concern." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
112. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). For a history of deceptive advertising as an
element in first amendment protection of commercial speech, see M. Lockett-John, Commercial
Speech and the First Amendnent (Dec. 9, 1980) (unpublished M.A. thesis in Univ. of Wash. Suzzallo Library).
113. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
114. Id. at 822.
115. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
116. Id. at 385.
117. Sex discrimination in nonexempt employment has been declared illegal .... Any First
Amendment interest which might be served by advertising an ordinary commercial proposal and
which might arguably outweigh the governmental interest supporting the regulation is altogether
absent when the commercial activity itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity.
id. at 388-89.
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not before been linked so closely with speech protected by the first
amendment. The conjunction augured trouble. In the political arena, the
legality or illegality of the object did not remove the speech from the center of first amendment protection so long as the speech did not transcend
advocacy to become incitement. 118 It would have been consistent for the
Court to recognize that the legality or illegality of the advertised products
or activities should not make a difference for purposes of first amendment
protection. The content of such advertising might well play some role in
informing the marketplace of ideas.
The Court, however, appeared dedicated to building a separate level of
protection for commercial speech; at that level, no value at all was to be
accorded to commercial speech dealing with illegal matters. The result
was inconsistent not only with the expansive Meiklejohnian ideal, but
also with the Court's own endorsement of a robust and error-tolerant debate in New York Times.
In 1976, in VirginiaState Board ofPharmacyv. VirginiaCitizens Consumer Council, Inc., 119 the Court struck down a Virginia statute that prohibited pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices. The case
involved no ringing statements on public issues; it was the most fundamental commercial message: "I will sell you the X prescription drug at Y
price. ' 120
The opinion by Justice Blackmun, endorsed by five other Justices, held
that consumers have a right to receive at least a part of the message conveyed by the merchant hawking his wares-that is, the product and the
price. "If there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to receive
the advertising .... ,,121 Virginia Pharmacy is the most extensive and
harmful acceptance thus far of a constitutional idea of a public right to
know. Justice Blackmun carried out his extension of the first amendment
in words that rang of the most calculated political rhetoric. Noting and
dismissing the advertiser's "purely economic" interest in price information, Justice Blackmun turned to the consumer's interest: "[T]hat interest
may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most
22
urgent political debate."
Justice Blackmun's effort to explain the elevation of messages about
products to the level of political discourse was strained. Resources are
allocated through "numerous private economic decisions," he wrote.
Since those private economic decisions have far-reaching implications
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
Id. at 761.
Id. at 757.
Ifd. at 763.
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for the economy, they ought to be "intelligent and well informed." 1 23 To
this point, the Justice's reasoning had no application to the first amendment at all, so he made the forced connection that regulation of the economy, certainly a public issue, depended on those private economic decisions being well informed. 124 Equating information about toothpaste and
shampoo with opinions that fueled public decisionmaking was a disservice to the first amendment. Justice Blackmun credited in a footnote the
writings of Alexander Meiklejohn. 125 That the philospher would have
been deeply troubled by that context did not seem to occur to Justice
Blackmun. The decision had fused what Meiklejohn eloquently insisted
had to be kept separate-public and private speech. 126 Meiklejohn stated
that the first amendment protects speakers absolutely, so long as they discuss public issues. The Court in Virginia Pharmacy, and in the other
commercial speech cases, asserted that freedom of the press also protects
commercial speech but in a restricted form due to the interests of the public and its desire to know about products and services. Commercial
speech which advertises illegal matters can be suppressed and commercial speech which advertises legal matters must be truthful and nondeceptive. Moreover, the Court recalled, it had long been accepted that the
state could impose time, place, and manner restrictions on any kind of
speech, including advertising. "The First Amendment, as we construe it
today, does not prohibit the State from insuring that the stream of commercial information flows cleanly as well as freely." 127 The extent of regulation permissible for its form of speech was further described in a footnote, in which Justice Blackmun noted that commercial messages might
be required to appear "in such a form, or include such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being
deceptive.' 1 28 Moreover, the hallowed prohibitions against prior re123. Id. at 765.
124. And if it is indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system,
it is also indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be
regulated or altered. Therefore, even if the First Amendment were thought to be primarily an
instrument to enlighten public decision-making in a democracy, we could not say that the free
flow of information does not serve that goal.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
125. Id. at 765 n.19.
126. If men are engaged, as we so commonly are, in argument, or inquiry, or advocacy, or
incitement which is directed toward our private interests, private privileges, private possessions,
we are, of course, entitled to "due process" protection of those activities. But the First Amendment has no concern over such protection. That pronouncement remains forever confused and
unintelligible unless we draw sharply and clearly the line which separates the public welfare of
the community from the private goods of any individual citizen or group of citizens.
A. MEIKLEIOHN, supra note 17, at 79-80.
127. 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976).
128. Id. at 771 n.24.
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straints of protected speech 129 might be made inapplicable in commercial
speech cases.
The Virginia Pharmacy decision required the formulation of a test of
deception to decide whether commercial speech enjoys or loses constitutional protection. That burden is passed to Congress, to the administrative
agencies such as the politically vulnerable Federal Trade Commission,
and, ultimately, to the courts. Yet such a test may not be easily found.
Chief Justice Burger expressed that fear in his concurring opinion: "I
doubt that we know enough about evaluating the quality of medical and
legal services to know which claims of superiority are 'misleading' and
30
which are justifiable." 1
13
In a dissent that referred to "second class First Amendment ights," 1
Justice Rehnquist suggested the issue was beyond the scope of the first
amendment. The common intercourse between seller and buyer had been
elevated to the plane previously reserved "for the free marketplace of
32
ideas."1
The problem raised by the case could have been attacked through antitrust, a revision of the state regulations, consumer class actions, or legislation. There is no compelling reason to conclude that the only way to
allow pharmacists to divulge their prices is to weaken the first amendment
by stretching it over their commercial enterprise. Moreover, once the rule
had been invoked in the case of pharmacists, it would, as Justice Rehnquist warned, have to be extended to other professionals and to other
kinds of commercial information. The Court indeed has become enmeshed in those questions, legislating case by case on the kinds of speakers and types of information subject to the new protection.
In 1977, the Court struck down a New York statute that prohibited advertising of contraceptives, and argued as it had in Virginia Pharmacy
that consumer interests required disclosure of information. 133 Then, consistent with Justice Rehnquist's warning in VirginiaPharmacy, the Court
reviewed the issue of attorney advertising and ruled that the State of Arizona could not prevent newspaper publication of truthful advertising
34
about routine legal services. 1
129. See Nearv. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
130. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 775 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
131. Id. at 786 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 781 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
133. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
134. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Attorney solicitation of business, traditionally prohibited by bar association rules, failed to gain first amendment sanction when the Court
reviewed the case of a lawyer who had visited a young woman in her hospital room to offer his
services for a personal injury suit. Speech, in this case, did not serve her need to deliberate about the
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By 1980, the Court had turned to a "four step analysis" as a way of
sorting out the kinds of commercial speech which, though protected,
would be subject to governmental regulation.
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the
First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it
at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask
whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. 135
The Court majority ruled against a state utilities commission ban on utility bill inserts that promoted electrical use, but Justice Powell suggested
that the utility commission still might restrict advertising format and content without breaching first amendment protection. The growing complexity of such matters prompted Justice Blackmun, the author of the Virginia Pharmacy opinion, to complain that "[n]o differences between
commercial speech and other protected speech justify suppression of
commercial speech in order to influence public conduct through manipulation of the availability of information."

136

In the area of commercial speech, the Court is engaged in an increasingly difficult chore of managing the flow of information that serves the
nation's commerce. Having accorded "second-class rights" to advertising, it necessarily must determine how to distinguish such speech from
that which the first amendment had traditionally protected. The inevitable
tests lead to the inevitable result that the speech the Court purports to
protect is subject to the shifting interpretations of the Justices. The mushiness of the Court's handling of commercial speech threatens to spread to
the realm of political speech.
If advertising of products were treated as a form of speech beyond first
amendment protection, the right to speak, at least, would retain some of
its original vitality. The first amendment interest in vigorous discussion,
in virulent debate so animated that error is its byproduct, has no bearing
on product promotion.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

A survey of the shifting meanings of press freedom in recent years
could range beyond the three substantive areas explored in this paper.
suit. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). Cf. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978)
(solicitation by civil rights attorney for purposes of political expression cannot be prohibited).
135. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,566(1980).
136. Id. at 578 (Blackrnun, J., concurring).
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Evidence of deserting basic first amendment concepts emerges in a variety of cases involving media rights.
In cases involving press demands for special access to public institutions, such as courts and prisons, the Supreme Court has framed the issue
not in terms of the press (speaker's) right to inform itself so it could
speak, but heavily on the public's right to know. Oddly, that right to
know has not, in recent cases, implied the right of the press to gather
news, but only the right of the government to determine to what extent its
prisons, courts, and public agencies should be revealed to the public, so
greatly in need of information. The right to hear implies little more than a
37
governmental right to restrict. 1
In the past few decades, then, two new models of free speech and press
have emerged, both purportedly embodying first amendment principles;
yet they are incompatible with one another. Their very differences demonstrate a growing elasticity or variability in the fundamental meaning of
the first amendment.
This society has long placed its faith in individuals, whose motivation
to speak and act has maintained the political compact so eloquently
described by Meiklejohn. Our trust has been that the society would prosper as long as the individual was free to act on his conscience. It was no
idle interest in selfish communication; we always have understood the
fundamental linkage between individual freedom and a healthy self-governing society. Free speech is precisely that: a right to speak. The rights
of the many hearers are important but derivative. Those who devised the
Debate Model tinkered with the basic philosophy of free speech and
press. In the Debate Model, the speaker is still protected but the value of
speech is weighed by its contribution to public good or welfare. Although
the Supreme Court has provided some important protections for speakers
in the area of libel, the philosophy of the Debate Model ensures only very
narrow protection for speech and press. Meiklejohn wanted to protect all
public speech absolutely; yet the Court never has adopted his broad definition of "public," and has indeed even narrowed his view, beginning
with Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. Additionally, the actual malice rule lays
bare the editorial process of the media under the guise of pretrial discovery.
Of more serious consequence, however, is the Right-to-Know Model.
At best, the "right to know" is sloganeering; at worst, it is a pernicious
137. See, e.g., Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (judges have discretion to close
pretrial hearings); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (media have no first amendment right
to information about conditions of jails); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (prison
regulations prohibiting face-to-face interviews of inmates by newsmen did not violate the first amendment).
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constitutional doctrine which is destructive of first amendment rights. The
problem is complex.
First, reporters, judges, and others have succumbed to the siren song of
this right to know because it sounds good. One scholar, John C. Merrill,
explains the fascination with the term: "Defenders of press freedom have
appropriated the expression (from where, nobody is quite sure) because it
sounds more democratic than the simple term 'freedom of the press' and
shifts the theoretical emphasis from a private and restricted institution
(the press) to a much broader and popular base (the citizenry)."' 138 As
Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde notes, the "right to know" is
a "wishy-washy" slogan designed to make the press seem "noble,"
while accomplishing nothing. 139 The press, he says, has the constitutional right to print many things that the public has no constitutionalright
40
to know. 1
Second, the right to know, as referred to here, is passive. It relies not
on a positive search for truth but on passive reception from others. At
best, it is a derivative "right" which depends upon the imagination, wisdom or strength of others, and thus it is no more than a second class
"right." As Thomas I. Emerson explains: "It is the speaker who is more
directly affected, is more highly motivated to secure his right, will press
harder to achieve it, and may have more power to succeed. To focus on
the more indirect and diffuse rights of the listener would likewise tend to
41
weaken the system." 1
Third, the concept, as these cases demonstrate, is vague. Walter
Gellhorn has noted, "the 'right to know' principle is itself so broadly and
vaguely phrased that it cannot decide cases. Judges must still decide the
cases." 142 Judges must and will rely on their own opinions in determining
the public's need to know. Such an unpredictable constitutionalstandard
may be of little value, because unpredictability in the application of first
amendment doctrine encourages self-censorship.
Fourth, the "right to know" must be defined by someone or some
group, independent of the listener. As Merrill notes:
Somebody or some group, of course, must decide what is "public business" or necessary information for the people to govern themselves. It is
exactly at this point that such a "right to know" dissolves-if it ever had
138.
139.

Merrill, The "People'sRight to Know" Myth, 45 N.Y. ST. B.J. 461,461 (1973).
Hans Linde, Fair Trials and Press Freedom-Two Rights Against the State (remarks to

Rocky Mountain-Pacific Northwest Regional Seminar on Freedom and Ethics of the Press, Portland,
Oregon (Apr. 1, 1977)) (transcript on file at the Washington Law Review).
140. Id.
141. Emerson, Legal Foundationsof the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 4-5.
142. Gellhom, The Right to Know: FirstAmendment Overbreadth?, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 25,
26.
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substance-for when it is agreed that somebody or some group must determine what the people shall or shall not know, the mythical nature of such a
"right" becomes very clear. 143
Fifth, the "right to know" is pernicious because it derogates the rights
of speakers. Limitations on freedom of commercial or broadcast speech
may come to haunt political speech. In cases involving the "right to
know," it is significant that the rights of the speaker have been consistently subordinated to listener rights, and thus often curtailed.
And sixth, any determination of what the public has a right to know
involves as well a determination of what the public has no right to know,
and thus involves censorship.
There are no easy solutions to the complex problems of free speech in
society; indeed, the hodgepodge created by the Court should convince us
of the lack of easy answers. In a perfect world, we could easily sound a
clarion call for absolute free speech. Yet our philosophers and institutions
weigh heavily against so fundamental or absolute a system.
At the very minimum, democratic society needs information to function. In his widest expressions, Meiklejohn provided a workable system
for speech which still gave great latitude to individual belief and thought.
As Justice Brennan wrote, Meiklejohn envisioned a wide ideal of public
speech: "Education in all its phases, the achievements of philosophy and
the sciences, literature and the arts, all fall within the subjects of 'governing importance' that the first amendment absolutely protects from
abridgement."144 Unlike Meiklejohn, however, we must not elevate the
listener unduly, for to do so is to jeopardize the basics of free speech and
press.
The great need for public information necessitates deregulation of
broadcasting. Regulation of content not only invites but assures the interference of a third party as filter, arbiter, and censor. 145
Lastly, it is easy to deceive ourselves in first amendment rhetoric, and
so it is essential to note that the extensive regulation of purely commercial
speech indicates the clear absence of first amendment rights. The claim
that commercial speech is protected under the first amendment is at best a
sleight of hand. Further, commercial speech merits no such protection
under Meiklejohn's scheme, for it is not public speech, but speech incidental to economic activity.

143. Merrill, supra note 138, at464.
144. Brennan, supranote 53, at 13.
145. Deceptive advertising would still be subject to regulation by the Federal Trade Commission
and appropriate state authorities.
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